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A B S T R A C T
There is an increasing recognition of the need to understand and address risks of various kinds in African cities.
However, there have been very few explicit examinations of the way in which the speciﬁc characteristics of
African urbanisation and urbanism drive risk, or the way in which responses to risk should take these char-
acteristics into account. This paper presents a critical review of the key features of African urban experiences,
and analyses the implications for the creation and reduction of diverse risks, from the everyday to the extensive.
It argues that the physical forms, social structures, economic pathways, and governance systems of cities on the
continent shape their risk proﬁles. Of particular importance are the nature of spatial expansion, the demographic
proﬁles of cities, and the prevalence of informal economies and settlements; while the reform of governance
systems will be critical to enable risk reduction. The paper concludes that urban development actors need to
consider the consequences of their actions for risk, while risk reduction practitioners will need to engage with all
elements of urban development, including informality, urban poverty, infrastructure and service provision, land
management, and local governance capacity.
1. Introduction
In an increasingly urbanized world, cities and their inhabitants are
facing signiﬁcant human and economic losses from disasters. Globally,
disaster risk continues to rise as more vulnerable populations and assets
are exposed to climate extremes. Cities in sub-Saharan Africa are pre-
dicted to experience some of the most severe impacts, not least due to
the low levels of adaptive capacity among urban populations. There are
considerable variations in severity and distribution within and among
urban areas: ﬂoods and mudslides in small towns in East Africa are
forcing many urban residents to leave their homes, while the growth of
cities like Benin City, Port Harcourt and Alexandria in mega-deltas are
increasing the number of people exposed to coastal hazards, such as
storm surges and sea level rise [32,58].
Urban risks can be understood as occurring across a spectrum, en-
compassing everyday, small, and large events [3]. This framing en-
capsulates both cumulative impacts of what are termed ‘extensive risks’
(including everyday hazards such as infectious disease and road traﬃc
injuries, and small disasters such as localised ﬂoods) and ‘intensive
risks’ (larger, less frequent disaster events such as tropical storms and
earthquakes) [20]. Yet, despite a growing body of literature on speciﬁc
risks, particularly ﬂooding in African cities (e.g. [11,29,33]), existing
literature and data sets do not capture adequately the way that current
patterns of urban development are shaping the types and levels of risk
in sub-Saharan urban areas [3,67,85]. There is thus an urgent need for
more nuanced understandings of urban risk in this region, particularly
how the nature and scale of these risks are shifting in the context of
persistent poverty, urban growth and climate change [63].
This paper presents a critical review of African urbanism and urban
change, and how these inﬂuence exposure to hazards of various types,
and contribute to the vulnerability of individuals, households and
communities. There is a growing body of literature on “the shift in
population from rural to urban settlements” [53], and some work on
natural population increase in urban areas and the spatial expansion of
urban land cover. Yet there is little research into the myriad political,
governance, economic, social, and cultural changes taking place in
African towns and cities, and still less consideration of the implications
for the generation, accumulation and reduction of risk. This paper ex-
amines these multiple dimensions of urban centres in Africa, going
beyond “urbanisation” to look at the ways that Africa's “urban re-
volution” is shaping exposure and vulnerability to hazards [60]. It is
well recognised that African urban contexts are highly varied with
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diﬀerent countries/sub-regions having very diﬀerent urbanisation le-
vels and urbanisation rates – while the arguments presented here are
relevant across the continent, the paper primarily uses data and cases
from sub-Saharan Africa.
The focus on African cities is not intended to underplay their pro-
found diversity across all variables: indeed, “if there is something in-
herently true to ‘the African city’, it is that it resists characterization and
simpliﬁcation in the manner demanded by Western-based rationalities”
([22]: 260). Yet Africa's urban transformation is characterised by some
key common features and particularities. The history and governance of
the region are markedly diﬀerent from other regions of the world
[26,38,42], and African cities are further distinguished by the scale and
pace of the demographic, social, economic and political transitions they
are experiencing [61]. The movement of cities through such transitions
is seldom smooth; rather, the rapid rate of urban change is likely to
increase the production and reproduction of risks [3,63,74]. Yet the
extensive urban growth and development anticipated in sub-Saharan
Africa also oﬀer considerable opportunity to address vulnerability and
disaster risk before or as it emerges. It is therefore important to focus on
the opportunities and potential for resilience building in emerging
urban centres: conceptualising urban physical environments “merely as
sites of risk misses seeing cities as wellsprings of environmental op-
portunities” ([57]: 90).
The following sections of the paper engage with diﬀerent elements
of African cities – their form, their societies, their economies, and their
governance – and explore the ways in which these contribute to the
production and management of risk. This analysis has relevance to a
wide range of current global policy processes: understanding and ad-
dressing the multiple dimensions of risk in African cities is crucial to
meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC and achieving
disaster risk reduction as outlined in the Sendai Framework; at the same
time, the Sustainable Development Goals and the emerging New Urban
Agenda need to shape urban development in ways that reduce rather
than accentuate risk.
1.1. African urban forms, dynamics and risk
1.1.1. African urbanism is characterised by small- and medium-sized cities
The majority of urban Africans have historically lived in cities and
towns of fewer than 0.5 million inhabitants [75]. Although population
data for small urban areas is not reliable, Fig. 1 shows that over 48% of
urban Africans lived in cities of less than 1 million people in 1990,
compared to 33% of urban Latin Americans and 38% of urban Asians.
However, these small- and medium-sized cities are experiencing rapid
growth, which – in percentage terms – may be more signiﬁcant than
that experienced in larger urban centres. This makes it diﬃcult to meet
demand for risk-reducing infrastructure and services, particularly con-
sidering historical underinvestment.
Small- and medium-sized urban areas often have disproportionately
smaller economies than larger cities. This is because larger cities can
achieve greater scale economies, where population density reduces the
per capita cost of almost all infrastructure and services are reduced, and
agglomeration economies, whereby proximity of labour, capital and
ideas create fertile markets and opportunities for knowledge spillovers
and specialisation [79]. There are exceptions to this trend, notably
where a smaller urban area is a political hub. However, the prevalence
of small urban areas in an African context contributes to lower urban
productivity and therefore lower per capita incomes. Similarly, local
authorities in smaller urban areas are likely to have less well-developed
technical, institutional and ﬁnancial capacities – including capacities to
manage risk – than those in larger urban areas, as they have a smaller
population to draw from and fewer resources to attract talent (see, for
instance, [50]).
1.1.2. African cities are undergoing spatial expansion
Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to experience the highest rate of
urban population growth globally in the coming decades [8,101]. This
population growth is occurring in an expansive rather than compact
form [76], resulting in falling urban population densities and a higher
rate of land use change than population growth rates alone might
imply. In Accra, for instance, urban land cover increased more than
twice as fast as the urban population between 1985 and 2000. Overall,
it is predicted that between 2000 and 2050 the area in urban use in sub-
Saharan Africa is projected to increase twelvefold [8]. This is a con-
sequence of inadequate planning, rapid population growth and lack of
ﬁnancial or technical capacity to deliver large-scale infrastructure
projects that might support liveable density [77].
In all contexts, urban sprawl comes with signiﬁcant costs. For those
who cannot aﬀord cars or even formal public transport, the need to live
within cycling or walking distance of employment hubs may mean that
people ﬁnd or build homes in hazardous areas within and around the
city, such as ﬂoodplains, mangrove swamps and unstable hillsides,
where formal development has been prohibited [31]. Much urban
spatial expansion is accordingly taking place in low-elevation coastal
zones and mega-deltas. Residents of these areas have higher levels of
exposure to environmental risks such as storm surges and sea level rise,
which are likely to be exacerbated by climate change [58,76]. As just
one example, Vermeiren et al. [91] project that, without policy inter-
ventions, the majority of Kampala's population will live in ﬂood-prone
areas by 2030 and suﬀer from epidemic diseases associated with poor
sanitary conditions.
Not only are informal settlements more likely to be in hazardous
parts of the city, but residents are less likely to have basic services and
infrastructure that can reduce risk, such as piped drinking water or
drains. The residents are also likely to lack secure tenure, which reduces
their incentive to upgrading housing and investing in amenities.
Finally, the residents of such areas are more likely to be recent mi-
grants, have low incomes or have otherwise reduced levels of adaptive
capacity [62]. These characteristics are both caused by and contribute
to exclusion from decision-making processes, which limits residents’
ability to advocate eﬀectively for risk reduction.
By signiﬁcantly altering the natural landscape, the spatial expansion
of African cities is causing myriad ecological impacts, including the
alteration of hydrological cycles, habitat loss and increased pressure on
forests and land. This environmental degradation generates new ha-
zards such as landslides and ﬂash ﬂooding [10,64,76]. In Lagos, for
instance, 70 per cent of the population lives in slums vulnerable to
environmental hazards, including regular ﬂood events [4]. Together
with risks for the city, rapid urban land change also produces risks from
the city to surrounding populations. For example, land use changes
have caused major losses of farmland at the border of the peri-urban
fringes, increasing economic pressure on small-scale farmers facing
land expropriations (for low monetary compensations) [43].
1.1.3. African cities remain closely connected to their rural hinterlands
Rural and urban areas have often been treated as separate and un-
related by both national governments and by international develop-
ment actors. Yet this ignores the importance of various types of linkages
between rural and urban areas [80], and the ways in which this shapes
risk. First, the spatial distinction between rural and urban is often far
from clear-cut, as a strong body of work on peri-urban areas has de-
monstrated [54]. These peri-urban areas demonstrate characteristics
both of cities and of rural areas, and act as important sources of food for
urban residents, as well as being locations in which many people who
work in towns and cities live. Second, individuals move to and from
urban centres, and frequently retain ongoing connections with their
home villages. This includes both rural-urban migration [83], and other
more complex and circular processes [66]. Third, rural and urban
economies are ever-more-closely intertwined, as rural residents in-
creasingly become net purchasers of food (rather than net producers)
[81]. Finally, food production, storage, distribution, and consumption –
including food security for low-income urban residents – relies strongly
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on networks that encompass both the rural and the urban [27,81].
Despite the interdependencies between rural and urban spaces
being ﬁrmly established in sub-Saharan African contexts, risk man-
agement policies and interventions have often focused narrowly on
either rural or urban areas [48]. This separatist approach fails to resolve
political, institutional and geographical fragmentation: a more co-or-
dinated and programmatic approach is required to reduce urban risks
generated in the periphery or wider hinterland. For example, the level
of water consumption and nature of infrastructure investment in
Kampala and Juba will have ramiﬁcations through the Nile catchment
to Khartoum and Cairo. Several South African metropolitan munici-
palities such as Cape Town and eThekwini (which includes the city of
Durban) are pioneering more integrated approaches to climate change
adaptation and disaster risk reduction through collaboration with other
municipalities [70]. Such collaboration is particularly important in sub-
Saharan Africa, where large and well-capacitated cities with ambitious
adaptation and DRR plans are surrounded by smaller and often urban,
peri-urban and rural municipalities that often lack the ﬁnancial re-
sources or the capacity to do the same [70]. This situation applies
universally but a consideration more speciﬁc to the African context is
the fact that peri-urban areas often fall under communal tenure ar-
rangements and traditional authorities.
1.1.4. African urban infrastructure is increasingly inadequate for the urban
population
The uneven condition of infrastructure and services in urban Africa
dates back to colonial times. Although many post-colonial governments
promised universal access to public water supplies and sanitation sys-
tems [15], this egalitarian promise has remained largely unfulﬁlled,
with signiﬁcant implications for the risks faced by urban residents.
Despite initiatives such as the International Drinking Water Decade and
the Millennium Development Goals, governments have proven unable
or unwilling to meet the demand of the growing urban population.
Indeed, the proportion of the urban population with water piped to
premises and/or access to improved sanitation decreased in Eritrea,
Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zim-
babwe between 1990 and 2015 [75]. Low-income groups suﬀer dis-
proportionally from deﬁcits in infrastructures and services. Disparities
in access to sanitation are particularly striking: while high-income re-
sidents are served by septic tanks or networked sewerage systems, pit
latrines are the most common sanitation facilities in low-income areas
[46]. Those who cannot even aﬀord pit latrines resort to open defeca-
tion or ‘ﬂying toilets’ [95].2
Inadequate access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation
produces extensive everyday hazards for the under-served or un-served.
Diarrhoeal diseases are the fourth most signiﬁcant cause of death in
sub-Saharan Africa [45], and are mostly transmitted via drinking water,
contaminated by faecal matter [9]. The highest risks are borne by
people accessing water through unsafe and untreated water sources,
such as shallow wells. Contaminants in these water sources can often be
attributed to open defecation or the poor maintenance of pit latrines,
which are very rarely emptied or are emptied in an unsafe manner [84].
To illustrate the scale of the service gap, in Dar es Salaam, over 75% of
the population living in informal settlements depend on informal and
unsafe pit emptying services, where the risks of exposure to faecal
sludge and contamination of drinking water sources are further in-
creased by ﬂooding or heavy rains [46].
Fig. 1. Proportion of the population living in urban areas with less and more than one million inhabitants globally, in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (data from UN-
DESA [87]). Although a higher proportion of African urban residents live in smaller urban areas in 1990 than in other regions, a larger proportion live in cities of more than one million by
2030 – signifying rapid and concentrated urban population growth.1
1 Population data are for urban areas with 300,000 or more residents in 2015. Fig. 1
therefore does not include urban areas that are currently smaller than this, many of which
may increase above this size over the next ﬁfteen years.
2 A ‘ﬂying toilet’ refers to a plastic/polythene bag used to collect faeces where sani-
tation facilities are inadequate, absent or unsafe. The ﬂying toilets are often thrown in
drainage canal or in the environment, increasing risks of exposure to faecal contamina-
tion and water pollution.
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Faecal contamination does not exclusively occur in informal water
supply services. Recent studies have demonstrated that microbiological
contamination occurs also in centralised water supply net-
works [72,73]. Further, in many cities, formal water supplies to low-
income areas are characterised by high degrees of discontinuity, which
forces urban dwellers to revert to unsafe water sources [44]. Risks of
diarrhoeal diseases may therefore also extend to the ‘served’ urban
population. Recognising the importance of safe drinking water to re-
duce health risk, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has developed
and supported the implementation of Water Safety Plans, aimed at as-
sessing and managing risks from the catchment to the consumer [14].
More recently, this approach has been extended to risks reduction along
the sanitation chain with Sanitation Safety Plans [94].
1.2. African urban societies and risk
1.2.1. African cities are young
African cities have a distinctive age proﬁle, with a predominance of
young people. Although disaggregated ﬁgures for urban areas are hard
to come by, children under age 15 accounted for 41 per cent of the
African population in 2015, and young persons aged 15–24 accounted
for a further 19 per cent. For comparative purposes, only 26 per cent of
the population in Latin America is under 15, and only 24 per cent of the
population in Asia UN-DESA [87] (Fig. 2). This age proﬁle has im-
portant implications for the full spectrum of risk and resilience. Chil-
dren and young people are physiologically and psychologically vul-
nerable to a range of shocks and stresses, with girls and boys who live
and work on the streets or in low-income informal settlements being
particularly susceptible to harm [13,19].
The ﬁnancial costs of providing this large young population with
adequate education and healthcare are also signiﬁcant. Yet there is the
potential for African economies and societies to enjoy a ‘demographic
dividend’, as this youth bulge progresses into the economically pro-
ductive age bracket. This youthful population also presents a potential
base for political and social transition towards more democratic pro-
cesses and modern economic activities.
The extent to which these opportunities will be realised in Africa is
uncertain. In some cases, the youth bulge has led to a crisis of youth
unemployment and underemployment. Scholars have suggested that
this creates a possibility of youths “becoming impoverished forces of
radicalization and conﬂict” (SOAC, 2014: 19). On the other hand,
Sommers [78] questions the connection between the youth bulge, ur-
banisation and instability, highlighting that nearly all recent civil wars
in Africa originated in rural areas. Certainly, appropriate economic and
social policies will be a major determining factor in determining whe-
ther sub-Saharan Africa's demographic dividend will become a keystone
of Africa's urban development trajectory or a major socio-political risk
(SOAC, 2014).
1.2.2. African urbanism and urbanisation are driving changes in gender
dynamics
Women's experiences in urban areas are highly varied and context
speciﬁc, shaped by factors such as location, education levels, household
proﬁles and wealth [96]. Typically, however, gender norms and dis-
crimination mean that women in African cities are likely to be more
vulnerable to environmental hazards than men, and face additional
socio-economic challenges [23]. Yet there are still very few gender-
sensitive city-scale climate and disaster management policies, let alone
measures in place that account for unequal power relations, societal
roles and labour divisions [97].
Gender norms around family care, household tasks and other re-
sponsibilities can mean that a woman's working day can be double that
of a man [25]. In many sub-Saharan contexts, the majority of urban
households remain dependent on biomass for fuels [88,89], while many
also have no on-site water access. In peri-urban and smaller urban
areas, cultural norms mean that the burden of collecting such resources
falls on women and girls – and the sprawling pattern of urban devel-
opment can make this task much more time-consuming and arduous.
Although men are more likely to be killed, women are twice as
likely to experience violence [86,23]. Women's access to health care is
often deprioritised relative to that of male family members, and they
face further discrimination within health care systems (again, mediated
Fig. 2. The number of men and women (millions) in each ﬁve year age group in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and globally (data from UN-DESA [87]). Although not
referring solely to urban populations, this pattern reveals the pronounced youth bulge in Africa relative to other regions.
D. Dodman et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 26 (2017) 7–15
10
by factors such as income, religion and ethnicity) [41,49]. Notably, in
twelve sub-Saharan African countries, low-income women in urban
areas are more likely than low-income women in rural areas to have
unmet need for family planning. These women mostly live in informal
settlements, and are excluded from a wide range of public services [34].
Women in urban Africa may therefore have more exposure to particular
types of risk (for example, natural resource scarcity and sexual abuse)
and lower adaptive capacity than men or rural women.
While recognising these barriers and inequalities, urban environ-
ments can oﬀer new and empowering opportunities for women. Women
in African cities and towns are more likely to be able to secure property
than their counterparts in rural areas, both because of their greater
socio-economic freedoms and because property can be acquired
through the market rather than through inheritance, where it is cus-
tomarily passed to male relatives [23]. The emergence and evolution of
urban cultures also create scope for the reconsideration of traditional
practices and values [60,82]. Although living in urban areas can create
new risks and pressures for women, particularly where these are com-
pounded through poverty and informality, African urbanisms may oﬀer
opportunities to shift problematic power relations and reduce gendered
risks.
1.2.3. African cities are often, but not always, violent
Sub-Saharan Africa has recently seen an “urbanisation of violence”
[90,98]. Unlike rural violence in Africa, which predominately involves
rebel and insurgent groups, urban violence is characterised by political
militias, communal violence and riots by civil society [68]. It peaks
during times of political unrest in countries which face political in-
stability: Raleigh [68] particularly identiﬁes elections as a time of risk,
oﬀering the examples of Côte d′ Ivoire (2010–2011), Kenya (2002,
2007, 2008), Nigeria (2011) and Zimbabwe (2008). In many parts of
urban Africa, the uncertainty, informality or even outright brutality of
policing systems create signiﬁcant additional risks for vulnerable and
marginalised groups.
Political violence in many urban areas can be attributed to changing
institutions and practices across the continent – in particular, a growing
tendency by central governments to privilege rural voters [68] or to
handicap municipal authorities controlled by opposition parties [69].
Xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments have further fuelled violence
in some cities, notably against Nigerian and Zimbabwean migrants in
South Africa. Yet a focus on large-scale or political violence can distract
from endemic interpersonal violence, such as murders, assaults and
gang violence. Whether violence is political or personal, it aﬀects po-
litical legitimacy, social cohesion and economic productivity, threa-
tening human development, security and resilience in African cities
[35].
In some cases, interventions in urban planning and governance have
signiﬁcantly improved the safety of African cities. The provision of
street lighting and improved transport systems, for example, can reduce
the opportunity for and incidence of violence [36], as demonstrated in
Kigali. In other cases, particularly in the absence of accountable formal
policing or eﬀective urban planning, many urban households rely on
community provision or private security to reduce the risk of violence.
While there is little empirical evidence examining the link between
violence and disaster risk, violence may act as a factor limiting the
locations in which low income households choose to live – and perhaps
encouraging settlement in hazardous locations. The direct eﬀects of
inter-personal violence are is also likely to reduce the adaptive capacity
of individuals and households.
1.3. African urban economies and risk
1.3.1. African urban dwellers are largely poor – and African urban areas
are expensive
The extent of urban poverty in Africa is frequently under-estimated
because most assessments fail to take into account the non-food costs
associated with living in urban areas [55]. This under-recognition of
poverty – and a frequently held attitude that urbanisation is undesirable
and should be prevented [52,65] –means that policies and priorities are
not set in ways that build the adaptive capacity of low-income groups in
cities.
Poverty additionally and perversely increases the cost of meeting
basic needs, particularly food and water. Urban food insecurity is a
considerable problem, as low-income residents often having to pur-
chase food from informal vendors at higher costs and more variable
quality [7]. Similarly, residents of low-income and informal settlements
frequently have to purchase water at high cost: studies in four cities
show that buying suﬃcient municipal water can cost a ﬁve-person
household without piped supplies more than 13 per cent of their in-
come if they are to meet even minimal water needs (20 l per person per
day) [56].
The high costs and poor quality of food and water mean that low-
income urban residents have relatively poor health [16], and are
therefore likely to be more susceptible to other shocks and stresses.
While poverty increases the cost of meeting basic needs, the cost of
living is also higher in real terms in urban Africa than in cities in other
low-and middle-income countries. A conservative estimate suggests
that, controlling for per capita GDP and other factors, urban dwellers in
sub-Saharan Africa pay 11–18% more for goods and services than
comparable cities worldwide [39]; another analysis of the same data
suggested that prices in African cities are 20–31% higher [24]. The
increment varies among diﬀerent kinds of goods and services: Naka-
mura [99] ﬁnd that food and non-alcoholic beverages cost 35% more
than in other countries, while rent (55%), communications (46%) and
transport (42%) – although a smaller part of most household budgets –
are also considerably more expensive. Of course, there is considerable
diversity within the continent: cities in Angola, Chad, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Malawi and Mozambique have higher prices,
while those in Gambia, Mauritania, Madagascar and Tanzania remain
relatively aﬀordable [99].
The higher cost of living means that urban residents in sub-Saharan
Africa have to spend a larger proportion of their income to achieve the
same quality of life as urban dwellers in other low- and middle-income
countries. This also reduces the resources available to them to spend on
risk reduction strategies such as upgrading their homes, purchasing
insurance or investing in preventative health care. This is particularly
true for low-income groups which already spend a larger share of their
income on meeting basic needs. For example, household surveys sug-
gest that the average urban household in Africa spends 39–59% of its
budget on food; for households in the poorest quintile, the share of food
expenditure reaches 44–68% [99]. Similarly, the high cost of vehicular
transport is prohibitive for many low-income groups. While the wide-
spread use of non-motorised transport might reduce the incidence of
road accidents or intensity of air pollution, dependence on walking and
cycling limits the mobility of low-income groups in the event of shocks
such as ﬂoods or storms. This may increase their exposure and sensi-
tivity to disaster risk.
1.3.2. African urban economies have small industrial sectors
Urbanisation often raises expectations of an “urban dividend: ac-
celerated economic growth due to scale and agglomeration economies
(discussed above; [79]) and structural transformation, as agricultural
labour moves to more productive activities such as industry and ser-
vices. Yet although urbanisation has been strongly associated with in-
dustrialisation in OECD and Asian countries, Africa's urbanisation has
not been coupled with industrialisation (with rare exceptions, such as
Johannesburg) [38].
A range of hypotheses have been put forward to explain this phe-
nomenon. A common explanation is that the higher living costs of
African cities, documented above, mean that Africa's urban labour force
requires higher nominal wages than that of other low- and middle-in-
come countries [24]. From the perspective of multinational businesses,
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this translates to additional operating costs without commensurate
improvements in productivity. It is therefore diﬃcult for African cities
to attract international capital to ﬁnance the development of domestic
industry. Other researchers critique the assumption that urbanisation
and industrialisation are necessarily linked. Fox [37] proposes that
improved agricultural production, energy supply and disease control
removed natural restrictions on urban population growth, allowing
urbanisation. He suggests that Africa's late urbanisation is a result of
region-speciﬁc barriers, such as particularly high rates of infectious and
parasitic diseases, a scarcity of navigable rivers and active constraints
on rural-urban migration in the colonial era. Alternatively, Gollin et al.
[40] propose that urbanisation is a function of income rather than in-
dustrialisation. Resource-extracting countries such as Angola, Nigeria
and Libya have therefore seen rapid urbanisation without the expected
growth in manufacturing output, as the export of minerals, oil and
other commodities generated higher average incomes. Finally, conﬂict
in rural areas may contribute to urbanisation – as shown by the high
numbers of refugees and other displaced people currently resident in
cities such as Kampala [18].
Whatever the cause, the breakdown in the relationship between
urbanisation and industrialisation signiﬁcantly increases the urban
population's susceptibility to risk. “Consumption cities” such as Lagos,
Libraville and Luanda tend to have a larger share of workers in non-
tradable services like transport, commerce and personal services (rather
than manufacturing or tradable services such as ﬁnance) [40]. These
sectors do not generate the same economy-wide spillovers and specia-
lisation beneﬁts as industrial activity [24,71], and are correlated with
much higher rates of poverty and inequality than have been observed in
“production cities” [40]. Without the opportunity to develop skills and
organise collectively, urban workers continue to depend on precarious
livelihoods and exert little inﬂuence over working conditions. The
nature of economic development in African cities therefore perpetuates
the vulnerabilities associated with lack of resources, knowledge and
voice.
1.3.3. African urban economies have a large informal sector
The informal sector has been portrayed in myriad ways over time.
Over recent decades, perceptions of the sector have shifted from the
disparaging “disadvantaged residual of segmented labour markets” to
the celebratory “unregulated micro entrepreneurial sector”
([51]:1159). What is celebrated in these portrayals are the private
sector characteristics of informal providers [5], often associated with
competition, innovation, ﬂexibility, willingness to invest and ability to
recover cost without government subsidies [59,100].
The informal economy has the potential to exacerbate local en-
vironmental degradation and other sources of risk – yet also to respond
ﬂexibly and contribute solutions to a range of challenges [20]. The fact
that informal providers operate ‘in the shadows’ means that they lack
formal state oversight and it is diﬃcult to enforce regulation, such as
water treatment standards or minimum wages [28,101]. This creates
risks for urban residents as prospective consumers and workers. Yet a
vibrant informal sector also allows urban residents to ﬁnd alternative
livelihoods in the absence or decline of formal employment opportu-
nities. This is particularly important where informal sectors are larger
and/or more dynamic than the formal economy, as seen in much of
West Africa [17]. Informal businesses and networks also frequently
assume responsibility for risk mitigation and management, for example
through savings groups that act as informal insurance schemes [28].
This complexity is eﬀectively illustrated by focusing on water and
sanitation. Small-scale informal providers are increasingly regarded as
a viable option for expanding these services, and thereby reducing risks
for low-income dwellers. Yet implementation of this strategy has typi-
cally presumed that formalisation of these myriad small-scale operators
is both necessary and desirable, in part to ensure more eﬀective en-
forcement of regulation on water quality and environmental protection
[20,28]. However, recent studies question this assumption. First, as
indicated above, formal service provision does not always entail good
water quality for all [73]. Second, governments may not be able to
regulate and control multiple small-scale providers without jeo-
pardising their feasibility through taxation, corruption or the costs of
compliance. Yet even where reliability is poor and price high, there can
be little doubt that informal provision of essential services is better than
no provision at all. Successful risk reduction strategies must recognise
the signiﬁcance of the informal sector in African cities, and collaborate
with informal operators in sensitive sectors such as food, water and
housing.
1.4. African urban governance and risk
1.4.1. Governance challenges and the creation of risk
The rapidity of sub-Saharan Africa's urban population and spatial
growth has put considerable strain on urban leaders and policymakers
and their ability to manage change [60]. Weak and fragmented gov-
ernance arrangements across the continent have limited capacities to
engage with these issues, let alone respond in ways that help address
urban risk and break cycles of risk accumulation. Urban governance in
Africa is made more complex by the scale of informality and depth of
poverty, with a large share of economic activity and service provision
taking place outside of oﬃcial regulations. While frequently eﬀective at
meeting the needs of urban residents in sub-Saharan Africa, the in-
formal sector is not necessary responsible for or capable of for ensuring
equitable access to risk-reducing infrastructure and services for all
places and people who require it.
Weak governance capacities and exclusionary planning systems,
many of them relics of the colonial era, have resulted in much urban
development occurring outside the parameters of oﬃcial spatial plans,
land and property markets or building codes [92,57]. Much of this peri-
urban and even urban land in Africa remains under tribal authority,
with traditional leaders holding signiﬁcant power over natural and
human resources as well as the direction of local development paths
and livelihood opportunities. The roles and responsibilities of local
government, traditional authorities and emerging actors such as com-
munity-based organisations are often ambiguous and contested, with
adverse implications for urban risk management [102]. The interplay
between formal and informal land use and planning lies at the heart of
urban risk management in Africa.
African urban areas are also being shaped by transformative
changes such as emerging technologies and geopolitical shifts, which
are accompanied by new actors and funding structures that upset “the
very conceptualisation of development as well as existing methods of
achieving it” ([21]: 7). For example, the onset of private sector-led
ﬁscal arrangements for urban construction and management during the
late 20th and early 21st centuries have reduced the power of local and
national decision-makers to ﬁnance and manage large infrastructure
projects in ways that balance social and private returns [65]. These
developments mean that African decision-makers face very diﬀerent
challenges and opportunities than their counterparts in other parts of
the world did at equivalent levels of urbanisation.
Inadequate revenue bases means that large investments tend to be
shaped by the availability of funds from other sources, including de-
velopment ﬁnance and loans from international development banks.
This means that policies and investments are inﬂuenced by the prio-
rities of donors, rather than those identiﬁed by stakeholders in the city.
It can also mean that investments in African cities are governed by
‘projects’ rather than by ‘planning’. Local governments are often under-
resourced in terms of technical staﬀ as well as municipal budgets, in-
cluding staﬀ who would be responsible for data collection and plan-
ning. This means that there is limited capacity at the sub-national level
to generate the evidence needed by decision-makers and that plans –
where they do exist – are based on out-of-date data [92]. The absence of
realistic plans, or the inability to implement them when they do exist,
creates a vacuum in which other actors initiate projects. This disjointed
D. Dodman et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 26 (2017) 7–15
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approach to infrastructure investment is likely to exacerbate exposure
to disaster risk, not least because power relations within most cities
dictate that the interests of high-income households and businesses will
be protected and selectively formalised.
1.4.2. Governance for risk reduction
While the reasons for the ineﬀectiveness of many local governments
and their planning systems in post-colonial African cities are well es-
tablished, good practices and approaches in urban planning and gov-
ernance in reducing risk and building resilience are not [1]. Local au-
thorities play a major role in shaping urban vulnerability and hazard
proﬁles through their decisions and actions around disaster prepared-
ness, infrastructure and service provision, land management and other
urban functions [22]. Yet the evidence base for local government-led
coordinated disaster risk reduction is limited and lack of capacity in
municipal authorities remains a critical challenge [63].
Looking beyond the formal mechanisms of government, urban
planning and investment in African cities is governed by a diverse and
fragmented set of actors and processes. These span the public, private
and civic sectors, and may be formal or informal (including traditional
authorities). This has led to the development of highly complex in-
stitutions that are navigated by actors with varying degrees of power.
Decisions within and about cities may therefore be driven by canonical
or shadow networks within and beyond municipal institutions [47].
Integrating risk reduction agendas into these processes is critical to
building long-term resilience and reducing disaster losses. At the same
time, however, there is a need to critically examine and shift these
norms to address the drivers of vulnerability: marginalisation, exclusion
and inequality. More adaptive and inclusive forms of governance need
to be pioneered which explicitly work with and respond to the needs of
those who are most exposed to risk.
In their attempts to overcome risk of various types, local authorities
are increasingly acting in partnership or through the combined inter-
ventions of multiple actors at multiple scales [22]. For example, local
authorities in Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe partnered with
organised communities of the urban poor in order to map sanitation
needs, develop local maps and co-produce basic infrastructure [12].
Nine African cities have joined C40 Cities while many more have joined
ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, transnational networks
that support their members to develop climate mitigation and adapta-
tion plans (one element of the spectrum of risks that cities face). Such
partnerships and collaboration between state and non-state actors can
help to overcome capacity constraints and oﬀer new sources of
knowledge to inform risk reduction strategies.
1.5. Conclusion
The discussion presented above demonstrates how many of the key
characteristics of towns and cities in sub-Saharan Africa – some of
which are unique to this region – play a signiﬁcant role in creating risk,
but also oﬀer signiﬁcant potential for addressing it. These include the
broad features of urbanisation and urbanism (demographic, spatial,
connectivity), the social dimensions (including those shaped by gender
and age), the economic dimensions (particularly the scale of poverty
and informality), and the over-arching governance processes that both
reﬂect and shape these other elements.
Taken together, what might this body of material indicate in rela-
tion to understanding and addressing risk in these cities? First, it shows
that risk production in urban centres is complex. It takes us beyond
looking only at hazards and vulnerability, to considering the multiple
ways in which hazards are created (notably through urban expansion
into exposed locations and through failures in infrastructure provision).
It also draws attention to the multiple ways in which vulnerability is
shaped, particularly the socio-political norms that determine access to
opportunity and resources. Second, it shows that there is a need for
policy makers at multiple scales to engage with both the proximate and
ultimate drivers of risk. While it is inappropriate to ignore the under-
lying drivers of risk to focus on the surface manifestations, the in-
transigent nature of these forces means that some amelioration of the
immediate expression of risk is often necessary.
Engaging with this in practice is tricky, and there are few strong
examples from Africa either of how addressing broad urban challenges
has also reduced risk, or how risk reduction activities have reshaped
urban politics more broadly. Indications of how this might be successful
can be seen in neighbourhood-level responses to particular hazards that
have re-shaped citizen-state relationships. The co-production of
housing and infrastructure in particular not only directly address spe-
ciﬁc risks, but has also demonstrated that it can create space for joint
action by civil society and governments (despite signiﬁcant conﬂicts in
many other areas of activity), enabling both to prepare for and respond
to shocks and stresses more eﬀectively. Examples include the con-
struction of community sanitation blocks to reduce disease in Kampala
[30], the enumeration of informal settlements in Nairobi to equip or-
ganised communities with the evidence base to negotiate eﬀectively
with local authorities [93] and the construction of walkway pavements,
drains and green space to reduce run-oﬀ in Johannesburg [2]. Such
alliances and networks, which amplify the voices and build the capa-
cities of vulnerable groups, have considerable potential to ameliorate
the political, economic and social drivers of risk in urban areas.
Three speciﬁc implications can be drawn from the analysis above.
First, the ways that the distinctive characteristics of African urban de-
velopment create and manage risk is poorly understood. The literature
reviewed includes few explicit eﬀorts at generating or analysing em-
pirical data that speaks to the generation or reduction of risk at the city
scale. Second, the complex inter-relationships described above indicate
that risk management needs to be taken into account in all urban de-
velopment eﬀorts in the continent. Eﬀorts to drive urban economic
growth, reform urban planning, and enhance human wellbeing will all
need to be seen through a lens of hazards and vulnerabilities to avoid
being undermined by shocks and stresses. Third, and related to this, the
risk reduction community must not conﬁne its eﬀorts in African cities to
narrow sectoral activities. Risk reduction practitioners need to under-
stand and engage with the multiple dimensions of urban development –
spatial forms, societies, economies and governance structures – if they
are to achieve their goals of reducing human suﬀering and maintaining
and enhancing development gains.
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